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Abstract   An analysis of ITQ fisheries management is offered in which two dif-
ferent groups of agents facing uncertain harvesting costs take part. The first
group, termed as the coastal fleet, is risk averse, while the second group, inter-
preted as the ocean fleet, is risk neutral. In contradiction to what is seen in
deterministic models of quota markets, given strongly decreasing absolute risk
aversion amongst the coastal fleet members, it is found that the initial quota al-
location affects the equilibrium quota price and the final catch distribution
influencing the economic efficiency in the fishing industry.
Key words   Transferable quotas, risk attitude, fishery management.
JEL Classification Codes   D8, H2, and Q2.
Introduction
In this paper, we discuss impacts of different attitudes towards risk on the equilib-
rium in a quota market. Our main questions are: How will uncertainty and risk
aversion affect the allocation of quotas and price in a competitive quota market?
How does a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) function when the
agents in the fishing industry have different attitudes toward risk? One can also ask
whether the government should try to influence the catch distribution and how such
policy should be designed under a regime allowing ITQs. The theoretical analysis
moves on to discussing Norwegian experiences.
In the textbook competitive quota market model, the quota price in the fishery
issued in perpetuity, would be equal to the net expected present value of the flow per
quota unit when assuming risk neutrality. In a short-term leasing market, where risk neu-
tral actors buy and sell quotas for a season or a year, the leasing price is shown to be
equal to the expected periodical marginal profit in the fishery. Using this theory, we
know that the catch volume for each firm under ITQs is independent of the initial alloca-
tion of quotas from public authorities. This means, that according to standard results, the
government has no control over catch distribution using an ITQ system. Practicing
transferable quotas in environmental policy was proposed by Dales (1968). The pro-
posal of introducing ITQs in fisheries management was first formulated by Christy
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(1973). Since then, the institution of ITQs has become an important political tool for
improving fisheries management. ITQs are primarily an instrument for promoting
economic efficiency (e.g., Hannesson 1996). For a more comprehensive review see
National Research Council (1999). In theory, it is possible to show that an ITQ sys-
tem will contribute to the maximization of economic rents from fisheries.
However, the introduction of ITQs may be difficult and controversial (Copes
1986). In spite of these problems, different ITQ programs have been implemented in
a number of fisheries in several countries. Grafton (1996) concludes that there is
evidence from Australia, Canada, Iceland, and New Zealand that ITQs have im-
proved economic efficiency and increased the returns of fisheries. For experience from
the Icelandic fisheries, see Arnason (1993, 1996), Palsson (2000), Eythorsson (2000)
and Matthiasson (1997). Similar experience is reported in several studies from the US
and Canadian fisheries (Hermann 1996, 2000; Matulich and Clark 2003; Casey et al.
1995; Macinko 1997; National Research Council 1999). These studies discuss a
wide range of interesting consequences following the introduction of ITQs.
In contrast to the cases from Iceland and New Zealand, rights-based fisheries re-
gimes in Norway have not involved a high degree of transferability or divisibility of
quotas. In Norway, most fisheries are regulated by license limitation and catch quo-
tas. Additionally, annual total allowable catches (TACs) are specified for most
fisheries. Fishing authorities distribute rights to harvest shares of the annual TAC ei-
ther to groups of vessels or to individual vessel operators. A TAC for a group of
vessels (“competition quotas”) has been practiced in both herring and cod fisheries,
but individual vessel quotas (IQs) have been more common in recent years.1 (For
overviews of Norwegian fisheries management, see Bergland, Clark, and Pedersen
[2001], Årland and Bjørndal [2002], and Standal and Aarset [2002].) For the cod
fishery with conventional gear, IQs were introduced for most of the fleet in 1990. A
key feature of these quotas is that quota transfer is not allowed. However, an indi-
rect trade in quotas takes place when vessels with quota rights are sold, and the
rights follow the vessel. Furthermore, illegal transfers of quotas between vessels
have been observed and prosecuted in court; presumably, other illegal transfers have
occurred, but remain undetected.
An interesting question is why Norwegian authorities have not implemented
ITQs on a larger scale. One possible explanation might be that they may be unaware
of the economic advantage of an ITQ system. However, based on the debate regard-
ing the different kinds of quota systems for fisheries management in practice, this
explanation seems implausible. Another explanation might be that although the authori-
ties know that ITQs normally secure economic efficiency, actors who have benefited
from the status quo, have the political power to block policy changes that would reduce
their advantages.2 Such an explanation might be relevant. The Norwegian government
has recently suggested that limited transfer of quotas within the coastal fleet may be per-
mitted (Ministry of Fisheries 2002). Under the new proposal, transfer will only be
allowed for vessels within the same length group and geographical area.3 The authori-
ties’ goal is that this change will reduce harvesting capacity and make the coastal fleet
more efficient, while precluding a geographical concentration of quota rights or the tran-
1 Efficiency aspects of these and other quota regimes that have been used or suggested for implementa-
tion in Norway are discussed in Bergland and Pedersen (2000).
2 An interesting study by Johnson and Libecap (1982) focuses on contracting problems and regulations
in fisheries in the US, where transactions costs become a crucial factor for understanding the actual
management decisions. Of course, the appearance of transaction costs might also be relevant in explain-
ing the Norwegian experiences.
3 Note that this is similar to restrictions on transfer in the Alaska halibut/sablefish IQ program (National
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sition to a homogenous large vessel fleet. These suggestions are discussed within the
fishermen’s organizations and in the coastal communities, and opinions differ. Some
fishermen support transfer of quotas because they expect that transfer will allow the
industry to become more profitable. However, all in all, there is considerable resis-
tance to programs that permit quota transfers. An argument often heard from the
opponents of transferable quotas is that they fear a reduction in the small-scale
coastal fleet and concomitant reductions in employment in the coastal regions.
A third plausible explanation for why Norwegian authorities have not imple-
mented ITQs on a larger scale is that the government has objectives other than
securing economic efficiency; for instance, maximization of employment in the fish-
ing industry (as seen in Canada [Crowley and Palsson 1992]). Such additional
objectives may lead to a policy of controlling the distribution of catch between ves-
sels and groups of vessels. The four main objectives presented by the Ministry of
Fisheries (1991–92) are: (i) preserving the pattern of settlement, (ii) protection of
fishery resources, (iii) securing employment in coastal areas, and (iv) increasing
profitability in the fishing industry. Although the goals are formulated in a general
manner, it can easily be seen that these objectives may lead to different policies, de-
pending on the emphasis put on each of the goals. Additionally, there are several
reasons for the government to be concerned about the final catch distribution in the
fishing industry. First, there may be unique stock externalities associated with the
selection of size and age in the catches, depending on the vessels’ gear. Second,
there may be variations in the quality of catches and landings that depend on gear
type or vessel size. For instance, the traditional production of stockfish requires a
certain size and quality of cod, which, in turn, requires a certain type of gear. In
general, the authorities want a fleet structure that fits the structure of the land-based
processing industry, securing high overall profitability in the fishing industry as well
as employment in coastal regions. In an even broader perspective, there may be
positive externalities for other industries (e.g., tourism) that are better served by a
continuation of the traditional fleet structure, particularly the smaller coastal fleet.
The fishing industry in Norway can easily be divided into two separate groups
(Bergland 1995). The first group consists of agents engaged in the conventional in-
shore fishery using relatively small vessels where the owner is typically the captain
of the boat. In this group, there are usually sole proprietorships or partnerships (self-
employed fishermen). We term this group the coastal fleet. The second group is
characterized by larger boats operating in the offshore fishery. The owners in this
second group are professional owners in the sense that they typically employ all
members of the crew, including the captains. This group is normally owned by a
limited corporation, and can hereafter be termed the ocean fleet. Members of the
two groups may have various attitudes towards risk. It seems reasonable to assume
that professional owners, operating vessels belonging to the ocean fleet, have the
opportunity to bear risks involved in the industry more easily than vessel owners be-
longing to the coastal fleet. There may be several reasons for believing in such an
assumption. First, professional vessel owners have the opportunity to diversify the
risks involved in the fishing industry through investment in other industries in
which the profitability increases when it falls in the fishing industry. Such risk di-
versification can also be done by professional owners through financial investments
in various capital markets. Operating owners in the coastal fleet are assumed to have
less time and knowledge to engage in such diversifications.4 Second, owners who
4 Another existing mechanism may be that small vessel operators diversify their income within the
household through employment outside the fishing industry. Furthermore, small vessel operators often
form purchasing or selling cooperatives and often negotiate risk pooling relationships with processors to
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actively participate in harvesting will have both labor and capital income stemming
from the fishing industry, while professional owners only have capital income from
the fishery. This makes the risks involved harder to bear for the coastal fleet than for
the ocean fleet. Finally, if the income level among professional owners is signifi-
cantly higher than for operating owners, and the willingness to bear risks increases
with income, vessel owners in the ocean fleet will be less risk averse than vessel
owners in the coastal fleet.
Inspired by the theoretical and empirical experience mentioned above, we have
adopted a simple model emphasizing different attitudes towards risk among the fish-
ing firms to discuss the impacts of uncertainty and risk aversion in a quota market.
Making analyses based on such a model can prove interesting for many reasons.
First, our model shows that the standard result from the deterministic case; i.e., that
the initial distribution of quotas has no influence on the equilibrium in the quota
market (catch allocation and price of quotas) does not generally hold in the case of
uncertainty and risk aversion. Secondly, risk aversion among fishermen may be one
explanation why the smallest operators have been dropping out, as in Iceland5
(Palsson 2000) and New Zealand (Hersoug 2002). Thirdly, the existence of a non-
transferable quota system in Norway can partly be explained by the actors’ risk
attitudes.
The model on which the analysis is based is introduced in the next section, and
the results of the analysis follow. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered.
The Model
In the model, the fishing industry is assumed to consist of relatively small harvest-
ing units. All agents are assumed to be price takers in both output and input markets,
as well as in the market for fishing quotas. Moreover, it is assumed that the harvest-
ing units can be segregated into two distinct homogeneous groups. To simplify our
model reasoning regarding possible differences in the two groups’ attitude towards
risks, we will assume that members of the coastal fleet (agent 1) may be risk averse,
while members of the ocean fleet (agent 2) are always risk neutral.6
Before the beginning of a year or other period when operators act (stage 1), the
authorities announce a TAC level, Y, and distribute the TAC among the operating
units. Fishing units have an ability to buy or sell fishing quotas in a market (stage 2)
before actually knowing the fishing conditions they will face in the period. Finally,
as the fishing conditions become known, the fishing units catch their yearly quotas
(stage 3). No matter which group a vessel belongs to, the harvesting costs on vessel
i,  Ci, which possibly differ between vessels belonging to the two groups, are as-
sumed to be dependent on the vessel’s catch level, yi, and stochastic events affecting
the fishing conditions for vessel i are symbolised by the variable qi. In order to
5 An alternative explanation for reductions in the number of small operators in the Icelandic fisheries is
that returns to scale render small vessels uneconomic.
6 In a discussion of fishermen’s attitudes toward risk, Clark (1985), pp. 230-31, proposes that there is
“little reason to expect fishermen to be particularly averse to short-term fluctuations in their income;
indeed, many fishermen may have a gambler’s taste for the daily ups and downs of their vocation.”
Later on he says that “for longer-term decisions, however, risk aversion is much more likely to be sig-
nificant. Most people who happily gamble with a day’s wages would hesitate to gamble with their an-
nual income.” In our discussion, we have the long-term decisions in mind. In a recent study of a com-
mercial fishery in Sweden, Eggert and Martinsson (2002) found a majority of fishermen to be risk
averse, and that the fishermen became more risk averse as the fraction of their income generated from
fishing increased.Risk Attitudes and ITQs 85
avoid corner solutions, it is assumed that the harvesting costs increase convexly
with regard to the catch level; i.e.,










d(yi)2 > 0, i = 1,2. (1)
A strictly increasing and convex cost function in the harvest volume makes the
analyses easier. However interesting cases, situations in which some fishermen
leave a portion of their quota unharvested, are impossible to identify as solutions in
our model. In a more realistic and complex analysis, which focuses on all effects
arising from stochastic production conditions, the distinction between fixed and
variable operating costs is reasonable. However, when we restrict our analyses to
different risk attitudes, our simplifications regarding the cost function are reason-
able.
It can easily be seen from equation (1) that better fishing conditions for vessel i
at sea, making it possible to catch the same quantity for a lower level of inputs and
therefore lower costs, here mean a lower value of qi. We have modelled the stochas-
tic influence on costs as a multiplier in the cost function. We consider the q’s as
normalized variables meaning that ex ante, before the actual fishing conditions be-
come known, the fishermen expect the value of the q’s to be 1; i.e., E(qi) = 1, i =
1,2. This implies that the expected harvesting costs, E(Ci), are equal to ci(yi). The
stochastic influence on the fishermen’s harvesting costs can be thought of as partly
firm specific in the sense that it reflects fortunate or unfortunate events for a par-
ticular operator (idiosyncratic shocks), and partly conditions affecting all vessels at
the same time (common shocks). An example of an idiosyncratic event might be the
actual fish accessible to a particular vessel, while the actual stock size can be an ex-
ample of a common stochastic shock variable.7
It should be noted that the cost function in equation (1) neglects the stock ef-
fects present in dynamic analyses; e.g., that high catch levels in one period reduce
the size of the fish stock and possibly also the growth rate of the stock. However,
given our assumption that the public authorities regulate TAC for each period, tak-
ing into account such stock externalities, the short-run cost functions in equation (1)
seem to be suitable when focusing on quota and catch distributions in the fishing in-
dustry.8 Furthermore, in a short-term analysis, in which the number of operators and
vessel capacity are fixed, it seems reasonable to assume that the higher catch vol-
umes result in higher expected costs, (dci/dyi > 0), and that costs increase at a
growing rate [d2ci/d(yi)2 > 0].
Fishing takes place during stage 3. At this stage, the value of the stochastic vari-
ables are known and each firm maximizes its profits with a given vessel quota. At
stage 2, the operators decide whether to buy or sell quotas, and at stage 1, the fish-
ery managers distribute an exogenously given TAC to the firms. In order to analyze
the behaviour of operators and the operation of the quota market, we solve the
model by backward induction starting with the vessels’ choices of catch level at
stage 3. Firm i’s profit at stage 3 is given by:
7 Danielsson (2002) analyses the efficiency of catch and effort quotas in the presence of risk. His model
includes environmental stochastic variations in the growth of the fish stock and in the catch per unit of
effort. Both of these stochastic variations may be involved in our random variable, q.
8 This simplification is used in other studies focusing on different agents in the quota market; e.g.,
Grafton (1992); Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Roberte (1996); and Matulich and Sever (1999). Another
example of a paper abstracting from the stock-growth relationship is Hannesson (2000). All these papers
assume risk-neutral agents.Bergland and Pedersen 86
Ri = pyi - qici(yi), (2)
where p is the dockside exogenous price of unprocessed fish.9 The problem facing
firm i at stage 3 is to maximize its profit given the quota constraint that actual catch-
ers cannot exceed the individual vessel quota:
y i £ ˜  y  i, (3)
where  ˜  y  i  is the individual vessel quota that agent i owns in the period. It is assumed
that the authorities monitor the operators effectively, preventing the vessels from ex-





where li is the increase in firm i’s profit from a small increase in its IQ. In cases
where quota regulation represents an effective constraint on the activity of firm i, it
will be the case that li > 0. We assume this to be the case so that equation (3) holds
as an equality. This means that even for high levels of q’s, where the fishing condi-
tions are poor, the vessel owner will find it advantageous to catch the whole quota.10
Furthermore, it follows from equations (2), (3), and (4), that the profit and catch
volume for each vessel are functions of the quota level and the stochastic variable;
i.e.,
Ri = Ri(˜  y  i,qi)  where  
¶R i
¶˜  y  i
= li(˜  y  i, qi),
¶2Ri
¶˜  y  i
2 =
¶li
¶˜  y  i
= -qi
d2ci
d(˜  y  i)2 < 0, (5)
¶Ri
¶qi
= -ci(˜  y  i) < 0,
¶2Ri










yi = yi(˜  y  i,qi) where
¶yi




= 0.  (6)
At stage 2, the agents buy and sell quotas before they actually know the realiza-
tion of the stochastic variable. This reflects an assumption of slowness and
inflexibility in the transferable quota market due to problems for the agents to buy
and sell quotas at the same time as they are conducting fishing operations at sea.
The public authorities, having the responsibility of ensuring that vessels do not ex-
ceed their quotas, might also close the transferable quota market before the fishing
season starts in order to have correct information of the quota distribution. Antici-
pated profits for the vessel owners can be defined by:
9 A more general assumption would be to introduce the ex vessel price of unprocessed fish as a stochas-
tic variable. This assumption will be discussed at greater length in the conclusion.
10 Clark (1985 pp. 231–35), amongst others, considers the case in which a vessel owner in some nations
would not find it advantageous or possible to catch the whole quota, meaning that the expected catch
becomes lower than the quota a vessel owns. Applying this reasoning at stage 2 in the model (see be-
low), it can easily be seen that even risk-neutral actors would reduce their net demand for quotas giving
a lower quota price compared to the situation in which the actors are facing a value of q = 1, being prof-
itable.Risk Attitudes and ITQs 87
pi = Ri(˜  y  i, qi) + k(y  i - ˜  y  i ),  (7)
where k is the price per unit of quota, assumed to be exogenous for each of the op-
erators, and  y  i  is the original quota the public authorities distribute to actor i.11 1
Then, following the traditional decision-theoretical approach when uncertainty ap-
pears (Clark 1985, p. 238), the vessel owners’ goal, ex ante, is to maximize the
expected utility from profit with regard to disposable IQ ex post,  ˜  y  i. The expected






d(pi)2 £ 0, i = 1, 2,  (8)
where U(pi) is a traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern’s (1947) utility function.12 In
this model, operators in the ocean fleet are assumed to be risk neutral; i.e.,  d2U2/
d(p2)2 = 0, while it is assumed that operators in the coastal fleet may be risk averse;
i.e., d2U1/d(p1)2 £ 0.
The first-order condition for agent i’s optimal choice of an ex post quota is
given by:
dEUi
d˜  y  i
= E ¢  U  i(pi )
¶Ri














= 0, i = 1, 2, (9)
which can be rewritten as:
E ¢  U  i(pi ) li(˜  y  i, qi) - k [ ] { } = 0, i = 1, 2. (10)
A further interpretation of this condition is given in connection with equation (15).
The second-order condition is:
d2EUi
d(˜  y  i)2 = E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi) li(˜  y  i,qi) - k [ ]
2
+ ¢  U  i(pi)
¶li







= Ai < 0, i = 1, 2. (11)
The second-order condition (11) is satisfied because Ui²(·) £ 0 and  ¶li ¶˜  y  i  < 0.
Equilibrium at stage 2 is determined by the two equations in (10), and a market
clearing condition that requires that the sum of initial quota allocations equal the
sum of ex post quotas; i.e.,
y  1 + y  2 = ˜  y  1 + ˜  y  2. (12)
Equations (10) and (12) implicitly define the endogenous variables k,  ˜  y  1, and  ˜  y  2 as
functions of the initial allocations; i.e.,
11 Grafton (1996) states that in all ITQ programs (to that date), fishers received a quota allocation free of
charge.
12 The term stems from von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) who first formulated the axiomatic foun-
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k = k(y  i, y j), ˜  y  i = ˜  y  i(y  i, y j), i, j = 1,2, i ¹ j. (13)
These functions are further expounded in the following analysis.
Prior to the actors’ decisions regarding transactions on the quota market, the au-
thorities distribute the TAC, Y, to the operators; i.e.,
Y = y  1 + y  2. (14)
Given this model, two interesting questions arise. First, how does the possibility that
members of the coastal fleet might be risk averse affect the quota market price and
the  ex post distribution of quotas and catches? Second, how do changes in the ex
ante quota distribution and the original level of TAC affect the quota market price
and the ex post distribution of quotas and catches when actors belonging to the
coastal fleet might be risk averse? These two questions are analyzed below.
Risk Attitudes and Quota and Catch Distribution
In order to reveal what happens in the quota market when an agent is risk averse com-
pared to the case in which all agents are risk neutral, equation (10) can be rewritten as:
E ¢  U  i(×) l i(×) - k [ ] { } = E ¢  U  i(×) [ ]E li(×) [ ] + cov ¢  U  i(×), li(×) [ ] - E ¢  U  i(×) [ ]k = 0 (15)
or
E l i(×) [ ] = k - gi,
where:
g1 =
cov ¢  U  1(×), l1(×) [ ]
E ¢  U  1(×) [ ]
£ 0 and g 2 =
cov ¢  U  2(×), l2(×) [ ]
E ¢  U  2(×) [ ]
= 0,
because U1² £ 0 and U2² = 0. From equation (15), it follows that a risk-neutral agent
chooses his or her optimal ex post quota such that the expected marginal gain in
profit for an extra unit, E[li(·)], is equal to the quota price, k, while risk-averse agents
choose a level of ex post quotas such that the last unit gives a higher marginal gain in
expected profit than the quota price; i.e., E[li(·)] > k. Given the same levels of the IQs ex
ante, this means that going from a situation in which the coastal fleet is originally risk
neutral to a situation in which the coastal fleet becomes risk averse, would result in
changes to the ex post quotas and the quota price approximately equal to:
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where the signs of the expressions directly follow from the assumptions. From the
assumption regarding the solution at stage 3, that equation (3) holds as an equality,
it follows that ex post quota volume and the final catch volume are identical (equa-
tion [6]). This means that risk-averse members of the coastal fleet will hold a lower
level of quotas than they would hold if they were risk neutral. Correspondingly, the
risk-neutral ocean fleet increases their level of quota holdings. In order to make
such transfers possible, the quota price must fall. For the ocean fleet, the quota price
reflects their expected marginal gain in profit by the last kilo caught, while the
coastal fleet has higher expected marginal gain in profit for their final unit caught.
Finally, it should be noted that the results in equation (16) generally hold for all
movements from risk neutrality to risk aversion, no matter how strong the aversion
towards risks becomes.
RESULT 1.  Members of the coastal fleet will hold a lower ex post quota (they
will sell more or buy less), when they are risk averse as opposed to risk neutral. The
equilibrium price in the quota market will be lower when members of the coastal
fleet are risk averse as opposed to risk neutral.
Let us now turn to the question of how changes in original quotas affect the ex
post quotas, the final catch distribution, and the market clearing quota price. In or-
der to do so, let us first take a look at how marginal exogenous changes in the initial
quota allocation and quota price affect behaviour. By differentiating the first-order
condition in equation (10), we obtain:
   E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi)(l i - k)2 + ¢  U  i(pi)
¶li







d˜  y  i + E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi)(l i - k)(y  i - ˜  y  i) - ¢  U  i(pi) { }dk
= -E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi )k(li - k) { }dy  i,
which gives us the following changes in the ex post quota and catch level:


















where Di = –E{Ui²(pi)(li – k)}k, Bi = E{Ui²(pi)(li – k)(y  i - ˜  y  i) – Ui¢(pi)} and Ai is
defined in equation (11). According to our assumptions, the signs of the expressions
in equation (17) are ambiguous. In order to reveal additional information, let us first
take a further look at the effect caused by a partial increase in the ex ante quota.
In the case where agent i is risk neutral, a partial increase in the initial quota,
y  i, has no effect on the ex post quota; i.e., ¶˜  y  i ¶y  i = 0 because Di = 0. In the case of
risk aversion, however, the sign of Di is generally ambiguous. Following the tradi-
tional assumption that an agent is likely to have decreasing absolute risk aversion, it
is shown in appendix A that Di £ 0, where the equality holds when the absolute risk
aversion is constant (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965; and Sandmo 1971). Strongly decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion means that the money an agent is willing to give up in
order to escape from uncertainty, the absolute risk premium, is a decreasing function
of income. If the agent has strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, increased ini-
tial individual quota would increase the agent’s ex post quota and catch level, while
constant absolute risk aversion, such as risk neutrality, would mean that the initial
quota has no effect on the catch level. The case of strongly decreasing absolute risk
aversion seems reasonable. Higher initial quota allocation increases wealth. In-Bergland and Pedersen 90
creased wealth increases the ability to bear risks, implying that wealthier individuals
will hold higher levels of quota ex post. Moreover, whether a risk-averse vessel
owner satisfying the assumption of strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion would
plan to catch exactly the additional ex ante quota units himself, buy additional quo-
tas in the market, or sell some of the increased ex ante quota is an interesting
question. Taking a look at the first expression in equation (17) and remembering the
negative signs of the variables Ai and Di (under conditions of strongly decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion), it can be seen that the outcome will depend on whether Di = Ai,
Di < Ai or Di > Ai. Using the definitions above, it follows that: Di – Ai = –E[Ui²(·)(li
– k)li] – E[Ui¢(·)(¶li/¶˜  y  i )]. In appendix A, given strongly decreasing absolute risk
aversion, the first term, –E[Ui²(·)(li –  k)li], is shown to be negative, while the sec-
ond term, –E[Ui¢(·)(¶li/¶˜  y  i )], is unambiguously positive due to the assumption of
increasing expected marginal costs in harvesting. This means that decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion will lead the coastal fleet to buy additional quota beyond their
increased ex ante quota holdings. The coastal fleet, as a consequence of having more
quota units initially, has become richer and is, therefore, willing to bear the in-
creased risk of buying additional quotas ex post. However, the coastal fleet must
also take into account that additional fishing activity will increase costs, which in-
creases their incentive to sell some of the increase in the ex ante quota units.
Consequently, we do not know whether the change in the coastal fleet’s attitude to-
wards risks, measured by the first term, dominates, is equal to, or is dominated by
the change in harvesting costs, measured by the second term. When the change in
attitude towards risks dominates; i.e.,  Di – Ai < 0 or, equivalently, |Di| > |Ai|, the
coastal fleet will buy additional quotas. If the cost effects dominate; i.e., Di – Ai > 0
or, equivalently, |Di| < |Ai|, the coastal fleet will sell some of the increase in initial
quotas.
The sign of Bi will be unambiguously negative in the risk neutral case; i.e., Bi =
–E[Ui¢(pi)], meaning that the effect on the ex ante quota caused by a partial increase
in the quota price will be unambiguously negative, most easily written as  ¶˜  y j /¶k =
1/E[¶lj/¶˜  y j (·)] < 0. The results in the risk-neutral case are well known. When mak-
ing a decision whether to buy or sell original quotas, the only thing that matters is
the expected marginal profit in harvesting, reflected in the difference between the
fish price and expected marginal costs, and the price of quotas, no matter what the
original quota level might be. The higher the price level on quotas, the more quotas
will be sold or fewer bought.
In the case of risk aversion, however, the level of quotas ex ante may influence
the final catch distribution, and the individual effect from increased quota price on
ex post quota holdings and catches is ambiguous. A necessary condition for in-
creased quota price to reduce an agent’s level of ex post quota is that Bi < 0. It is
shown in appendix B that a sufficient condition for having this intuitively reason-
able result is that the risk-averse actor has a low level of proportional risk
aversion,13 meaning that the agent is willing to give up a fraction of a low income
(when experiencing a high level of q) if they receive the same fraction of a higher
income (when experiencing a low level of q).14
13 In a situation in which the initial wealth is 0, the proportional risk aversion is defined as the absolute
risk aversion function (see appendix A) multiplied with the income; i.e., – (Ui²/Ui¢)pi = ripi (Lindley
1985, pp. 178). Having a low proportional risk aversion means in this case of no initial wealth that ripi < 1.
14 Thon and Thorlund-Petersen (1993) define such relative gambles and call the actor in a situation with
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RESULT 2.  (a) If a member of the coastal fleet has strongly decreasing absolute
risk aversion, an increased initial individual quota would increase the agent’s ex
post quota and catch level, while constant absolute risk aversion would mean that
the initial quota has no effect on the catch level. (b) A sufficient condition for the
result that increased quota price will reduce an agent’s level of ex post quota is that
the agent has a low level of proportional risk aversion. If the agent is risk neutral,
as in the case of constant absolute risk aversion, increased quota price will reduce
an agent’s level of ex post quota holdings.
Now, let us take a look at how changes in initial quotas affect the behaviour of
the agents as well as the quota price. Differentiating equation (10) for i = 1,2 and
equation (12) gives:
 A1d% y1 + B1dk = D1dy1
 A2d% y2 + B2dk = 0 (18)
 d% y1 + d% y2 = dy1 + dy2.
First consider a redistribution of quotas from the risk neutral to the risk-averse
agent; i.e., from firm 2 to firm 1. We assume that dy1 = -dy2 > 0 . By using Cramer’s s
rule in equation (18), we derive the following solutions:






















Following our initial assumptions regarding the agents’ attitude towards risks, the
denominators in the expressions will be positive. Moreover, both numerators will
also be positive. If the risk-averse agent has strong decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion, a redistribution of quota from the risk-neutral agent to the risk-averse agent
leads to a higher catch volume for the risk-averse agent and a correspondingly re-
duced catch volume for the risk-neutral agent and a higher quota price. It should
also be noted that if the absolute risk aversion is constant, the redistribution of ini-
tial quotas will have no influence on the final catch distribution or the quota price.
RESULT 3.  A reallocation of initial quotas from the risk-neutral ocean fleet to
the risk-averse coastal fleet results in higher catches in the coastal fleet (and corre-
spondingly lower catches in the ocean fleet) and an increase in the quota price.
There is no effect on the equilibrium of reallocations in cases where both actors are
risk neutral or when the coastal fleet has constant absolute risk aversion.
Now, let us take a look at the case in which the TAC increases, and the increase
is given to the ocean fleet; i.e.,  dY =dy  2 > 0 and  dy  1 = 0. The results, derived from
equation (18), when restricting ourselves to situations with low proportional risk
aversion are:Bergland and Pedersen 92
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This suggests that an increase in the total quota will reduce the quota price, regard-
less of risk preferences. The decrease in the quota price would lead both members of
the ocean fleet and members of the coastal fleet to catch more. This means that the ini-
tial increase in the ex ante quota, originally given to the ocean fleet, will be distributed
among both groups (because  d˜  y  2 dy  2 <1), meaning that the ocean fleet will tend to
increase its supply of (or reduce its demand for) quotas, and members of the coastal
fleet will tend to increase their demand for (or reduce their supply of) quotas.
RESULT 4.  Given a low proportional risk aversion amongst the members of the
coastal fleet, an increase in the initial quota for the ocean fleet, due to an increase
in the TAC, leads to increased harvesting for both groups and a decrease in the
quota price.
Let us now consider the case of an increased total quota and that the increase is
given to the coastal fleet; i.e.,  dY =dy  1 > 0 and  dy  2 = 0. By restricting the discus-
sion to situations in which the coastal fleet has low proportional risk aversion,
which implicitly means decreasing absolute risk aversion, it is seen from equation
(18) that:
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(D 1 - A1)A2
A1B2 + A2B1
£ (>)0 as A1 £ (>)D1.
That is to say an increase in the ex ante quota allocation to the risk-averse coastal
fleet for a given level of initial quota to the ocean fleet will increase the harvest in
the coastal fleet. As long as the catch increase for the coastal fleet is assumed to be
lower than the increase in the total quota; i.e., |D1| < |A1|, catches in the ocean fleet
will also increase and the quota price will decrease. As noted above, this will hold if
the increase in expected marginal costs for higher catches in the coastal fleet domi-
nates the effect measuring lower absolute risk aversion as a consequence of being
wealthier. In the opposite case, in which the effect of reduced risk aversion domi-
nates the cost effect; i.e., |D1| > |A1|, the coastal fleet will buy more (sell fewer)
quotas from the ocean fleet and the quota price will increase.
RESULT 5.  Given low proportional risk aversion among the agents in the coastal
fleet and implicit decreasing absolute risk aversion, the allocation of additional ini-
tial quotas to the coastal fleet will result in an increased harvest for the coastal fleet
at a given level of ex ante quotas for the ocean fleet. If the cost effect dominates (is
dominated by) the risk aversion effect for the coastal fleet, the harvest level by the
ocean fleet increases (decreases) and the quota price falls (rises).Risk Attitudes and ITQs 93
In our model, economic efficiency in the fishing industry can be defined by
catch levels that maximize the total expected profit for the two groups of fishermen.
This is equivalent to minimizing the total expected costs in the fishing industry, and
is, therefore, a necessary condition for economic efficiency. Alternatively, one may
consider the catch levels that maximize the sum of the expected utilities for fishing
firms to be an efficiency goal. Here we have chosen the first one, because the total
expected costs of harvesting for this alternative are lowest. Maximizing the total ex-
pected profit for the fishing industry can be seen as a partial economic efficiency
goal for the public authorities. Finally, let us take a look at how changes in initial
quotas may affect the total expected profit for the two groups of fishermen. It is well
known that economic efficiency based on this objective is secured when the ex-
pected marginal profits for the two groups are equal and, moreover, that the
efficiency in the industry increases as the difference between the expected marginal
profits decreases. Let the difference between the expected marginal profits be de-
fined by Z = El1 – El2 > 0, where the inequality holds when the agents belonging to
the coastal fleet are risk averse, see equation (15). Then, by using equation (19) and
remembering that El2 = k [from equation (15)], a redistribution of quotas from the



















dy  1 = -dy  2 > 0.
The first term in equation (22) is non-positive because ¶l1 ¶˜  y  1 < 0 and D1B2/(A1B2 +
A2B1) ³ 0, and the second term is shown as: –[D1A2/(A1B2 + A2B1)] £ 0, given de-
creasing absolute risk aversion among coastal fleet members. This means that a
redistribution of quotas from the ocean fleet to the coastal fleet, given strongly de-
creasing absolute risk aversion among coastal fleet members, reduces the difference
between expected marginal profits and, therefore, increases economic efficiency in
the industry. The intuition is that the risk-averse coastal fleet members become
wealthier when their levels of initial quotas are increased, leading to less risk-averse
behaviour and a better functioning quota market. Similarly, based on equations (20)
and (21), increasing the TAC level and distributing the increase to the ocean fleet
























































where:  dy  1 = dY > 0,dy  2 =0.Bergland and Pedersen 94
In equation (23), the effect on Z of giving the ocean fleet a higher initial quota
is found. Given B1 < 0, the first term is unambiguously negative, while the second
term is unambiguously positive, implying that the difference between the expected
marginal profits may be higher or lower, depending on whether the first or second
term dominates. However, as seen in equation (24) where the effect on the ocean
fleet is compared to the effect on expected marginal profits following from an in-
creased initial quota for the coastal fleet, the effect is shown to be higher for the
coastal fleet than for the ocean fleet. This means that if one wishes to increase the
TAC level, the increase in the difference between the marginal profits becomes less
(or the reduction between the marginal profits becomes higher) if one gives the
coastal fleet additional quotas compared to a situation in which the ocean fleet is
given the increased TAC, given that the coastal fleet members have strongly de-
creasing absolute risk aversion. The economic reason is that, as a consequence of
having additional quotas, the risk-averse coastal fleet becomes more willing to bear
risks involved in harvesting.
RESULT 6.  A redistribution of initial quotas from the ocean fleet to the coastal
fleet leads to higher economic efficiency in the case of strongly decreasing absolute
risk aversion in the fishing industry. Under the same assumption, an increase in the
TAC level will lead to the highest total expected profit in the fishing industry, if the
additional quota units are distributed to the coastal fleet.
In order to approve economic efficiency, an alternative strategy could be that
TAC should only be given to risk-neutral actors (in the ocean fleet).15 However,
implementing such a strategy would increase the total expected harvesting costs be-
cause of the convex cost function, even though the need for insurance due to risk
aversion would disappear.
Concluding Remarks
In order to draw some political implications from our analysis, let us apply our main
results to the structure of the Norwegian fishing fleet. First, we consider Result 3
concerning a redistribution of the initial quota from the risk-neutral ocean fleet to
the risk-averse coastal fleet. The public authorities have preferences for preserving
the pattern of settlement and securing employment in coastal areas. Result 3 sug-
gests that a redistribution of quotas in favour of the coastal fleet results in higher ex
post quotas and higher catches in the coastal fleet, making it easier to satisfy the so-
cial goals of stable settlement patterns and employment in coastal areas. The
economic mechanism behind this conclusion is that the coastal fleet becomes more
able to bear the risks involved in fishing as a consequence of being wealthier when
their initial quota share is increased (while leaving in mind the assumption of
strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion). Taking a look at the expected marginal
profit from harvesting for the two groups, the expected value for the coastal fleet ap-
proaches more closely to the expected marginal profit for the ocean fleet. A higher
ex post quota level for the coastal fleet means reduced expected marginal profit for
this part of the fleet, while lower ex post quotas for the ocean fleet imply higher
marginal profits. This means that the proposed redistribution of initial quotas not
only affects income distribution, but also increases economic efficiency, measured
in aggregated expected profit stemming from the fishing industry. However, it
15 This was proposed by a colleague at a research seminar.Risk Attitudes and ITQs 95
should be remarked that actually implementing redistributions of initial quotas
might be difficult, due to the historical fishing rights the actors may have estab-
lished.
Many traditional fisheries in Norway, as well as many fisheries all over the
world, have in recent years been faced with a need to reduce TAC levels due to past
overfishing. Now, applying our Results 4, 5, and 6, let us consider what happens
when a reduction in TAC is implemented. As seen from our analysis, the effect of
reducing TAC depends upon the group taking the burden. When the coastal fleet
bears the total reduction, the members of the fleet, as a consequence of being poorer,
want to reduce the risks. This leads them to reduce their ex post quotas (sell more/
buy less). This does not occur in the risk-neutral ocean fleet. Consequently, when
the coastal fleet bears the total TAC reduction, economic efficiency in the fishing
industry, as measured by the expected aggregated profit, decreases. Therefore, from
a political point of view, a reduction in TAC, if needed, should be implemented by
making cuts in the initial quotas given to the ocean fleet.
Our conclusions, and possible policy implications mentioned above, are based
on an analysis of a model in which we have made several simplifying assumptions.
First, we have divided the fishing fleet into two homogeneous groups, a risk-neutral
ocean fleet and a risk-averse coastal fleet, whose risk aversion declines as profits in-
crease. The basic assumption in our reasoning is that where one group of owners is
significantly more risk averse than the other, differences in attitude towards risk
among vessel owners affect the functioning of the quota market. The final catch dis-
tribution not only reflects the expected marginal costs for the different groups, but
also the most risk-averse actors’ needs to insure themselves against unfortunate
events in the future. The central hub of our reasoning is that the more the quota mar-
ket behaves as an instrument for the agents to diversify risks, the less the final catch
distribution will reflect the expected marginal profit for the actors. If we change the
assumption about risk attitudes for the two groups; i.e., assuming that the coastal
fleet is risk neutral and the ocean fleet is risk averse, our conclusions will be re-
versed. Second, our model includes a rigid separation between three sequential
decision-making stages. The quota market is considered to be a leasing market for
quotas, in which it is practically or legally difficult to trade in quotas during the sea-
son (year). The opposite case would be that it is a perfect possibility to transfer
quotas after all aspects of harvest costs are known with certainty. Our model is un-
suitable for discussing impacts of different attitudes towards risk in the case of
perfect information. However, no matter how flexible the quota market functions,
there will always be some aspects affecting costs that are unknown before fishing
begins, such as weather conditions and stock accessibility. The coastal fleet is more
vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and reduced stock accessibility because it
includes smaller vessels with reduced range and hold capacity. This is an argument
for analyzing quota markets in which agents may have different risk preferences.
Third, we have ignored stock dynamics. In some fisheries where ITQs have been in-
troduced (e.g., Iceland and New Zealand), there are both markets for quotas issued
in perpetuity and short-run leasing markets (for a year or a season). To study the
market for perpetual quotas, we believe that it would be necessary to account for
stock-growth relationships. However, modelling stochastic environmental variables,
stock dynamics, and different risk preferences would involve a complex analysis
that might not necessarily provide additional qualitative insight regarding the func-
tioning of quota markets. Fourth, we have treated stochastic events in our model as
cost uncertainty. In practice, agents will often have imperfect information concern-
ing a wide range of variables; for instance, the price of raw fish (p). However,
modelling additional stochastic variables may not change our main results. Finally,
the cost function in our model is simple. We ignore the distinction between fixedBergland and Pedersen 96
and variable costs and other possible decompositions of costs in the fishing industry.
Altogether, our analysis is based on several simplifying assumptions. We believe
that this paper points to an important issue, namely the functioning of quota markets
when actors have differing risk preferences. However, further empirical and theo-
retical research will be necessary to determine the relevance and robustness of the
results drawn from our analysis.
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Appendix A
The degree of risk aversion is measured by the absolute risk aversion function, de-
fined by:
r i = -
¢ ¢  U  i(pi)
¢  U  i(pi)
= ri(pi), ¢  r  i(pi ) £ 0, (A1)
which is assumed to be decreasing in profit, ri¢(pi) = –Ui¢¢¢(pi)/Ui¢(pi) + [ri(pi)]2 £ 0.
It is seen that a necessary condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion is that
Ui¢¢¢(pi) > 0. The following reasoning is analogous to that found in Arrow (1965) and
Sandmo (1971). Let li = k now define a particular value of profit, pi
0. Then li < k
would mean a profit below pi
0; i.e., p < pi
0, and li ³ k would mean pi ³ pi
0. Accord-
ing to equation (A1) it follows that:
r i
0 = -
¢ ¢  U  i(pi
0)
¢  U  i(pi
0)
³ -
¢ ¢  U  i(pi)
¢  U  i(pi)
when pi ³ pi




¢ ¢  U  i(pi
0)
¢  U  i(pi
0)
£ -
¢ ¢  U  i(pi)
¢  U  i(pi)
when pi < pi
0(li < k).
From equation (A2) it then follows that:
- ¢  U  i(pi)(l i - k)ri
0 £ ¢ ¢  U  i(pi)(li - k)  for all possible values of pi. (A3)
Then, taking the expectation on both sides of the inequality in equation (A3) and us-
ing the first-order condition in equation (10), it follows that:
E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi)(l i - k) [ ] ³ -ri
0E ¢  U  i(pi)(l i - k) [ ] = 0, (A4)
where the equality holds when the absolute risk aversion is constant. This means
that:
Di = -kE ¢ ¢  U  i(pi )(li - k) [ ] £ 0, (A5)
where the equality holds for constant absolute risk aversion. Now, taking a look at
the difference between the term Di and Ai, it follows that:
Di - Ai = -E ¢ ¢  U  i(×)(li - k)l i [ ] - E ¢  U  i(×)
¶li






ú  = -E ¢ ¢  U  i(×)(l i - k) [ ]E li [ ] (A6)
-cov ¢ ¢  U  i(×) li(×) - k [ ], li(×) { } - E ¢  U  i(×)
¶li







According to equation (A4), the first term on the right-hand side of equation (A6) is
negative when the absolute risk aversion decreases strongly. The second term is alsoRisk Attitudes and ITQs 99
negative because the correlation between li and U²(·)li must be positive when abso-
lute risk aversion decreases (implying that Ui¢¢¢(·) > 0, see the comments on equation
A1). The sum of these first two terms on the right-hand side of (A6), being unam-
biguously negative, can be thought of as measuring the actor’s less averse attitude
towards risks when being richer, while the third term, being unambiguously posi-
tive, reflects that the expected marginal cost increase when harvesting more, see the
discussion regarding the size of Di – Ai in the text.
Appendix B
Using the definition of Bi in the text, Bi can be reformulated as:
B i = E ¢ ¢  U  i(pi)(li - k) [ ](y  i - ˜  y  i) - E ¢  U  i(pi ) [ ]. (A7)
The second term in equation (A7) is always negative, while the sign of the first term
will depend on the sign of E[Ui¢(pi)(li – k)] and  (y  i - ˜  y  i). This means that given the
case of constant absolute risk aversion, this first term is 0, meaning that Bi is nega-
tive. Moreover, in the case where an actor plans to harvest exactly the amount of
fish given by the ex ante quota, the first term is 0, meaning that Bi is still negative,
no matter what the actor’s attitude towards risks may be. However, in the case of
strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, implying that (A4) holds strictly, the sign
of the first term will be negative when the actor buys additional quota units,  y  i < ˜  y  i.
It will be positive when the actor sells some of the initial quotas, i.e.,  y  i > ˜  y  i. This
means that we know for sure that an actor, who buys quotas and has strongly de-
creasing absolute risk aversion, will always want to reduce her catch (by buying less
quotas) when the quota price increases. However, whether an actor, who initially
sells quotas and who has strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, would reduce
her catch (by selling more quotas) when the quota price increases, relies on the as-
sumption that the absolute value of the positive first term is dominated by the
absolute value of the negative second term. The intuition behind the positive first
term in this case is that the actor, originally selling quotas, becomes richer when the
quota price increases, making it easier to bear the risks involved in harvesting, par-
tially leading to a wish for increasing ex post quotas. Given strongly decreasing
absolute risk aversion, we know that when this positive “indirect income effect,”
caused by an increase in the quota price, is dominated by the “direct substitution ef-
fect,” an actor, initially selling quotas, just like an actor originally buying quotas,
wants to reduce the level of ex post quotas when the quota price increases.
However, in order to consider the sign of Bi more generally in the case of risk
aversion, no matter whether the actor initially buys or sells quotas, let us use a defi-
nition found in Thon and Thorlund-Petersen (1993). Consider a situation in which
an actor, i, is facing a fear gamble; he or she could obtain a low income n1 with
probability  1⁄2 and a high income n2 with probability 1⁄2. The expected utility of the
income is then:
EUi(Wi + n) [ ] =
1
2
Ui(W i + n1) +
1
2
Ui(W i + n2),
where Wi is the actor’s initial income.
According to the definition in Thon and Thorlund-Petersen (1993), an actor, fac-
ing a fear gamble, is relatively risk loving, or, as we choose to say, has a low levelBergland and Pedersen 100
of proportional risk aversion when she will be willing to give up a share, e, of the
lowest income given that this state of the world is realised, if she additionally re-
ceives the same share, e, of the highest income when this is realised. The expected




Ui Wi + (1 - e)n1 [ ] +
1
2
Ui Wi + (1 + e ) n 2 [ ] > E U i ( W i + n ) [ ] (A8)
or
Ui Wi + (1 - e)n1 [ ] + Ui Wi + (1 + e)n2 [ ] > Ui(Wi + n1) + Ui(Wi + n2).
Now, using a first-order Taylor approximation on the two terms on the left side of
the inequality, implying that Ui[Wi + (1 – e)n1] @ Ui(Wi + n1) – en1Ui¢(Wi + n1) and
Ui[Wi + (1 – e)n2] @ Ui(Wi + n2) – en2Ui¢(Wi + n2), then gives:
-en1 ¢  U  i(Wi + n1) + en2 ¢  U  i(Wi + n2) > 0 or n1 ¢  U  i(Wi + n1) < n2 ¢  U  i(Wi + n2). (A9)
Remembering that n1 < n2 implies that equation (A9) is equivalent to the statement
that nUi¢(Wi + n) increases in n; i.e.,
d n ¢  U  i(Wi + n) [ ]
dn
= ¢  U  i(Wi + n) + n ¢ ¢  U  i(Wi + n) > 0. (A10)
By using the following definitions n =  (l i-k)( ˜  y  i - y  i) and Wi = Ri(·) –  li(˜  y  i - y  i),
meaning that W i + n = pi, it can be seen that (A10) is analogous to:
¢  U  i(pi) + (l i - k)(˜  y  i - y  i) ¢ ¢  U  i(pi) > 0.
When equation (A10) holds for every realisation of qi, it must hold for the expected
value; i.e.,
E ¢  U  i(pi) + (li - k)(˜  y  i - y  i ) ¢ ¢  U  i(pi) [ ] > 0. (A11)
The inequality in equation (A11) then implies Bi < 0. In a situation in which the ini-
tial income is 0, this means that the proportional risk aversion, defined in footnote
11, is below 1; i.e., –[Ui²(·)/Ui¢(·)]pi < 1. A utility function giving a constant propor-
tional risk aversion, 1 – b, is given by U = a(pi)b, a > 0, 0 < b < 1. It can be easily
seen that this utility function gives decreasing absolute risk aversion, implying that
low constant proportional risk aversion necessarily leads to decreasing absolute risk
aversion.